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Abstract
To what extent should the child’s point of view be included when a political community endeavors to
make just decisions, and why? Democrats are committed to a principle of political inclusion grounded
in equal respect for persons. Yet we regularly deny children the right to vote and we often just assume
that the citizens doing the hard work of democratic deliberation are adults. As I will show, electoral
conceptions of democracy can plausibly reconcile this tension in a way that requires no serious
adjustment to the principle of inclusion. However, I also argue that a similar reconciliation seems
unavailable to deliberative conceptions of democracy, and this fact has implications for how deliberative democrats should understand political inclusion and its relationship to the aims of schooling. I
do this by providing a broad overview of deliberative conceptions of democracy, with a focus on some
fundamental epistemic features of these conceptions, to explain why deliberative democrats must
take a different approach. I then look at different arguments for children’s deliberative inclusion and
propose an account of my own. Finally, I use this account in order to offer a different perspective on
the aims of schooling under deliberative conceptions of democracy.
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Children’s Inclusion as a Philosophical Problem

T

o what extent should the child’s point of view be
included when a political community endeavors to
make just decisions, and why?1 The question of
inclusion matters for democrats, who are in general committed to a
principle of political inclusion grounded in equal respect for
persons. However, the literature on voting rights has surfaced a
1 For ease of writing I will use the terms child and children. But I have in
mind here any minor, such as adolescents. Very young children are
physically incapable or have not acquired even basic understandings.
The child I therefore have in view is someone who can speak and act but
is nonetheless denied rights of participation.
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tension between this principle and children (Fowler, 2014; Rehfeld,
2011; Schrag, 1975, 1977, 2004). In brief, any argument for why
children and adolescents should be excluded from voting also
justifies the exclusion of adults on relevantly similar grounds. For
example, if it is justifiable to exclude children because they lack
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knowledge of their own political community, “lacking knowledge”
becomes reasonable grounds for excluding anyone.2 Other
arguments for exclusion—maturity, personal autonomy, and
cognitive ability—encounter similar problems. It appears as if we
are forced to conclude that the principle of inclusion is mistaken in
some fundamental way or to concede that there is no reason why
children should not—at least in principle—have an equal say in the
democratic process. We can call this the generalization problem of
children’s political inclusion.
At the same time, it is a widely held intuition that children’s
political preferences—their views on certain questions of
public policy, for example—should be treated with greater
circumspection than the preferences of other citizens. Think of
how we often treat children in other spheres. My son is interested
in coin collecting. He has the rare opportunity to visit a coin shop,
but this visit will conflict with his long-awaited doctor’s appointment. His preference is to go to the shop over the doctor. Knowing
his preference shapes my action in certain respects. For example, I
commit myself to visiting a coin shop with him in the future. But
the purchase that his preference has on what we do is limited in
important respects. I take him to the doctor even when his
preference is to skip the appointment, and I do this because I am
responsible for his well-being. A similar relationship seems to hold
between adult and child citizens. It seems unreasonable to hold
child citizens fully responsible for the consequences of their
unformed and malleable preferences, including the potentially
harmful public and political consequences that would arise if they
were to have equal say on various matters. To be sure, some
adolescents exhibit a high degree of knowledge and sophistication
on some public issues. But even here, they are likely to change their
views as they learn from experience. So, while we are willing to
hear children out, and even allow their preferences to inform our
own political decisions to some degree, we remain cautious about
how much independent weight we are willing to assign to these
preferences. We can all call this the circumspection problem of
children’s political inclusion.
The generalization and circumspection problems point to a
tension within the democratic ideal. On the one hand, circumspection is a powerful intuition. We deny children the right to vote and
we often just assume that the citizens doing the hard work of
deliberation are adults. On the other hand, any grounds we might
proffer for justifying our intuitions about circumspection, if
generalized, commit us to the view that some adults should not be
allowed to vote or that citizens must meet some proffered standard
of competence before they should be included in deliberation. As I
show, electoral conceptions of democracy can plausibly reconcile
the tension in a way that requires no serious adjustment to the
democratic principle of inclusion. I also argue that a similar
2 One might argue that adults have acquired a status, such as “citizen,” that
children do not have and that this status makes arguments about
competence inapplicable to adults. However, this fails to explain why
adults (and not children) should have this status in the first place, for
reasons that do not ultimately appeal to competence criteria such as
knowledge, maturity, or autonomy.
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reconciliation seems unavailable to deliberative conceptions of
democracy, and this fact has implications for how deliberative
democrats should understand inclusion and its role in our political
institutions.
In the first section, I explain how electoral conceptions of
democracy can address children’s inclusion by rethinking the
nature and scope of voting practices. In the second, I provide a
broad overview of deliberative conceptions of democracy, with a
focus on some fundamental epistemic features of these conceptions, to explain why deliberative democrats must take a different
approach. In the third section, I look at different arguments for
children’s deliberative inclusion in the literature, and I propose an
account of my own. In the fourth section, I use this account in
order to offer a different perspective on the aims of schooling
under deliberative conceptions of democracy.

Children’s Inclusion in the Electoral Democratic Order
All democratic societies place age restrictions on voting. Yet
democracy is a fundamentally inclusive form of governance. This
theory/practice disjuncture has led political philosophers to ask
if the exclusion of children is a legitimate policy or a failure of
democratic principle. For example, Schrag (2004) argues that
the exclusion of children cannot be an ad hoc addition to the
inclusive rule but something that follows from our understanding
of the nature of political inclusion itself. Accordingly, arguments
for children’s exclusion cannot be self-defeating; that is, they
cannot establish a precedent that, if applied generally, would
contradict the principle of inclusion.
There is little evidence that such arguments are available to us.
Philosophers and political theorists have struggled to identify just
what, if anything, sets children apart from adults in the democratic
order. They have advanced several proposals, usually developmental in nature: that is, that citizens must pass a certain threshold of
maturation or development before being granted voting rights.
These proposals range from Kantian autonomy (Shapiro, 1999),
Rawls’s (1996) two moral powers (Coleman, 2002), and Kholbergian stage theory (Christiano, 2001). None solve the consistency
problem, for in practice, adults from all walks of life fall short of the
ideal. Christiano (2001), for example, argued that children should
be cut out of the franchise because they are “not capable of
elaborating or reflecting on moral principles; they adopt moral
ideas from their parents not out of a sense of conviction but out of
desire to please and a sense of trust in their parents. For the same
reasons, children do not have a developed sense of their own
interests.” (p. 207). Yet these reasons apply to many adults as well
(see Schrag, 2004, p. 371).
The tension between democratic principle and practice leads
Schrag (1975, 2004) to advocate for what I call the practice-based
approach to children’s democratic inclusion. Schrag argues that the
theoretical problem—that any attempt to justify why children
should not be included seems to contradict our democratic
commitments—is itself misconceived. There simply are no
theoretical reasons for excluding children. Young children and
adolescents should in principle equally participate in the democratic order. But how best to include them is a question whose
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answer turns on establishing political practices most appropriate,
given their ability and competence (Schrag, 2004, p. 378).
The appeal of the practice-based approach is that introduces a
helpful distinction between the means of inclusion and the end of
inclusion. Under the electoral conception, the basis of social choice
is an aggregation of preferences, where an inclusive choice is one in
which everyone’s preference informs the decision with the majority
preference ruling (Elster, 1997). If true, it is the public expression of
the preference that counts, not voting per se. That is to say, voting is
a practice that enables the public accounting of preferences, with its
universal practice satisfying the inclusive end. Because voting is
here understood as a means to inclusion and not an end in itself, we
can problematize children’s inclusion differently. Circumspection
doesn’t have to mean that children should not be included; rather,
it can mean that the practice of voting is an unreliable means of
including children’s preferences in political decision-making.
Children have difficulty understanding how their preferences align
with what’s on the ballot, for example, or they are not fully aware of
the long-term consequences if their expressed preferences were to
be fully counted in the decision-making process.
We expect adult voters to vote as an individual and without
cognitive or other forms of assistance. Children seem unable to do
this. When we see unassisted voting and the counting of preferences as one and the same, it seems as through the simplest
solution is to defer the child’s right to vote until they pass some
threshold point. But once we distinguish the ideal of inclusion (the
counting of everyone’s preferences) from the means of inclusion
(the practice of voting), the electoral state has some latitude to play
with. It can modify the practice of voting to ensure that the child’s
preferences register in ways that are meaningful for the political
decision-making process while also taking into account the level of
circumspection adults should reasonably take with respect to such
preferences.
Practices of this kind are by no means far-fetched. We can look
to contemporary examples for inspiration. There have been a variety
of proposed voting mechanisms for including children’s preferences,
such as extra proxy votes for parents or fractional votes for young
voters (Rehfeld, 2011, p. 158). These approaches suggest that the
“normal” way that preferences are publicly expressed in the electoral
state (one individual citizen, one unassisted vote) can be altered to
better fulfill the inclusive principle.
Proxy-voting for children might be justified on inclusive
grounds. We could argue, for example, that voting for children
ensures that their preferences are counted when they were not
before. However, one might object that these and similar practices
still run afoul of the generalization problem. This is because the
justification of a proxy must appeal to reasons that explain why
the child is assigned a proxy vote and not an unrestricted right to
vote on their own. These reasons, we can be sure, will appeal to
premises about circumspection. But if we say that children are
entitled to a proxy vote but no more, for circumspect reasons, it
follows that relevantly similar adults are entitled to a proxy vote
(but no more).
Yet the practice-based approach has still more to offer.
Suppose a society proposed that parents or guardians should act as
democracy & education, vol 26, n-o 2

electoral proxies for their children. Can this policy be justified
without falling into the generalization trap? Much turns on the
nature of the practice. For example, we can introduce a distinction
between an expressive proxy and a trustee proxy. An expressive
proxy is one who attempts to translate, or communicate, a preference on behalf of another person who is unable to do so on his or
her own. I can’t make the committee meeting, so I direct you to
vote for me, knowing you know where my preference lies. A trustee
proxy is one who is entrusted with expressing preferences that will
benefit his or her client regardless of their client’s own preferences.
I have never been to a meeting, so I ask that you vote for me,
trusting that you will vote in a way that serves my best interests
given that I do not understand the stakes involved.
Neither practice can be applied to children in general. This is
because the justification of such practices has the form “because
children lack some competence/maturity/knowledge condition X.”
But whatever “condition X” is, it overreaches by capturing relevantly similar adults within the same democratic community. For
example, assigning a trustee proxy involves taking away someone’s
right to express their own preference and replacing that expressive
right with those of a more competent trustee. To deny such a right
to a group of citizens, such as children, involves a judgment about
that group’s ability in general to form “good” or “desirable” or
“wise” preferences, a judgement that, due it it’s vagueness, can be
applied to any individual outside the group who meets those same
conditions. If we say that children in general should be assigned a
trustee proxy, it would follow that any relevantly similar adult
should also be assigned a trustee.
But let’s take the example of expressive voting and, instead of
grounding our argument in claims about the competence of
children in general, focus on aspects of the practice of voting that
may impede their inclusion by virtue of the fact that those practices
are not a good fit with the competence of some citizens. When
parents act as expressive proxies, they endeavor to understand and
interpret their child’s preferences and express them through a vote.
As Elster puts it, “[p]references are never ‘given’ in the sense of
being directly observable. If they are to serve as inputs to the social
choice process, they must somehow be expressed by the individuals” (1997, p. 6). Accordingly, imagine a situation in which a local
municipality is reviewing a proposal to clear out a green space for a
condo development and decides to put the proposal to a public
vote. Children in the local neighborhood often use that green space
as a play area. On the expressive account, it would be a procedural
requirement that children be informed of the proposal and what
the implications are for the local area. Further, these children
would each be given the opportunity to articulate their preferences, with assigned proxies casting the vote that best represents
that preference.3 The practice of expressive proxy-voting does not
3 This is a sketch of what this practice could look like. Various voting
mechanisms could be developed for different contexts, decisions and
levels of government. However, these mechanisms would have to be
developed with a careful eye on their justification because the barriers to
inclusion that are being addressed should not overreach or overgeneralize in a way that could disenfranchise other citizens. In my example,
children simply don’t know about the proposed development and,
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establish a precedent that, if generally applied, would justify large
numbers of adults having their vote taken away and replaced by
proxies. And this is because the grounds for expressive proxy-
voting are specific.
The practice of expressive proxy-voting ensures that a citizen’s
preferences are counted when they are unable to publicly express
such preferences on their own.4 By specifying what is getting in
between a citizen and their inclusion, the practice of expressive
proxy-voting can respond to a range of context-specific conditions
under which it is would be appropriate to impose a proxy on
citizens, conditions more likely to apply to children than adults.
That is to say, the practice makes no generalizations about the
competence or fitness of groups of citizens; rather, it identifies
practical barriers to the expression of preferences and seeks to
overcome them. Further, because the practice enables the expression of a preference where it was not, or could not, be expressed
previously, the adoption of this practice in democratic society is
rightly understood as a move closer to the end of inclusion.
It is important to emphasize that, according to the account
that I have given, the practice of proxy-voting applies to any
citizen that has serious difficulties expressing a preference on their
own. Empirically speaking, the conditions that would have to
obtain for an expressive proxy to be fairly applied would be more
likely to occur in the case of children and less often in the case of
adults. But we can imagine that some adults would be included
within the expressive proxy framework; that is, we can find
situations in which certain adults require support in the expression
of their preferences. Being more flexible in our voting practices so
that they can enable more citizens to express their own preferences
does not establish a precedent for the exclusion of adults (or
children); rather, it expands the inclusivity of the democratic
principle.
In this way, generalization can refine our democratic practices
by testing our assumptions about the competence of citizens
against the implications of such assumptions for the (dis)enfranchisement of the population. Rather than argue that children fall
short of some general competence threshold and exclude them, we
start with the fact that some citizens (mostly children, but some
adults too) happen to have various difficulties expressing their
preferences in the public sphere, and guided by the democratic

further, may not know how to match their preference with a yay or nay
vote. The barrier establishes the nature and scope of the proxy intervention, but no more. This would be different than an overreaching
intervention, that is, one made on the grounds that children in general
are “incompetent” or “lack maturity.” I thank the anonymous reviewer
for encouraging me to clarify this point.
4 This does not mean that proxy votes are a good practical solution. For
example, there is no guarantee that parents will respect these conditions
and cast their votes based on a sincere effort understand their children’s
preferences. Expressive proxy-voting assumes parents would be willing
and able to vote out of respect for what they think their children’s
expressed interests would be and not what they believe is in their child’s
best interests regardless, and it also assumes that parents would not use
the extra votes to advance their own interests. But then, no voting
practice operates exactly as envisioned under ideal conditions.
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principle of inclusion, we improve our practices in recognition of
these difficulties.

Children’s Inclusion in the Deliberative Democratic Order
In the last section, I detailed how the electoral conception of
democracy can in principle handle the tension between circumspection and generalization. It can do this by drawing a distinction
between the means of inclusion (voting) and the end of inclusion
(the counting of preferences). Of course, we can challenge, modify,
or revise different aspects of this account while still recognizing the
distinction. And it is the distinction that is important for my
argument about deliberative inclusion, because this distinction
appears to be unavailable to deliberative democrats, making the
question of children’s deliberative inclusion a more intractable
problem. Here is why:
Recall that the conception of social choice underlying
electoral democracy makes it plausible to view children’s inclusion as a problem of democratic practice. But deliberative
democratic theory proffers a different conception, in which
citizens engage in reason-giving as a means to public agreement.
It takes the view that communicative efforts at mutual understanding and agreement should have an educative or transformative effect on the preferences of deliberators (Miller, 1992). That
is, under the right conditions, it is possible for citizens to be
convinced, without coercion or manipulation, of the merits of a
policy or political decision in terms of that decision’s consequences for the interests of all affected by that same policy or
decision (Gutmann, 1999; Habermas, 1990). Accordingly, all
affected by the observance of a proposed norm or policy should
have an equal opportunity to challenge the merits of that proposed norm. In short, agreement under conditions of inclusion,
symmetry, and reciprocity are epistemic criteria of political
decision-making (Okshevsky, 2016). Unlike electoral democracy,
then, deliberative theories do not see a valid decision as something that can be inferred from, or traced back to, predeliberative
preferences.
Deliberative democrats believe that their conception can
mitigate the individualism and self-interest that can drive electoral
decision-making. But this also means that it is more difficult to
cache out children’s democratic participation in terms of the end of
inclusion, on the one hand, and means of inclusion, on the other.
For example, we might want to say that public agreement is the
inclusive ideal, while reason-giving by all is the means to that
inclusive ideal. However, reason-giving, or making independent
claims about justice, is a constitutive feature of a valid norm or
agreement and is not so easily scaled to an individual’s competence. I cannot give a fractional reason, for example. I either give
reasons or I do not. This matters profoundly for deliberative
inclusion. Consider that one way to understand the value of
democratic deliberation is that it enhances the epistemic quality
of political decisions made in the interests of justice and fairness.
On this view, the inclusion of different viewpoints makes it more
likely that a community of inquiry will discover the right answer,
or if we take a more constructivist view of political justification,
inclusion is part of what makes a decision right, valid, or
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legitimate.5 In either case, the epistemic value of deliberation
weighs strongly in favor of political inclusion in general. For, if
successful political decisions reflect the interests of all affected by
such decisions and, in a diverse society, we cannot know and
understand all the interests and values of our fellow citizens we
therefore have the epistemic principle of political inclusion: the
likelihood that a political decision is successful increases as we
include the perspectives of those affected in the decision-making
procedure, either because (a) our chances of discovering a successful decision are higher or (b) the decision is more likely to be
constructed in such a way that it can be recognized by all affected
as successful.6 I take various forms of the epistemic principle of
inclusion to be implicit in most, if not all, conceptions of deliberative democracy.
Given that questions of justice and fairness affect both
children and adults, we can further make claim to the epistemic
principle of children’s political inclusion: the inclusion of children is
as epistemically valuable as the inclusion of any other constituency
affected by a political decision.
However, there is an unacknowledged premise operating in
the argument that requires us to rethink the epistemic principle of
inclusion in either its general or its child-centred corollary: Any
individual or group affected by a decision is more likely to make an
epistemic contribution if his or her viewpoint is included in
deliberation than if it is excluded. We can call this the contribution
premise. Note that without the contribution premise, we have no
way of accounting for why we need the inclusion of all affected to
know and understand the interests of all affected. For example, one
might reject the epistemic principle of inclusion because some
participants are just not very good at giving reasons or because
their worldview is so unreasonable that it is easily trumped by
other arguments.

5 Alongside inclusion, constructivists also require further epistemic
conditions such as truthfulness on the part of those who speak and equal
opportunities to make relevant contributions. See footnote 3.
6 Note that Martí’s (2006) overview of epistemic conceptions of deliberative democracy distinguishes between constructivist and realist
conceptions. Realist epistemic conceptions take the view that the right
answer to political judgments lies “outside” of, or independent of,
deliberation. The greater our inclusion, the more likely it will be that we
find this answer. Constructivist epistemic conceptions take the rightness
of norms or political judgments are internal to, or dependent on,
deliberation. Another way to put this is the independence of a political
judgement relies on the fulfilment of certain deliberative conditions. My
view is that realist conceptions are inappropriate to questions of justice
or political decision-making understood broadly. A political decision is
of high epistemic quality when it is justified in terms that are convincing
from the standpoint of all deliberators. But this means that if a competent deliberator is sincerely unconvinced by the merits of a norm or
decision, his or her dissent signals that the community’s consensus may
not be as well justified as believed. But on realist accounts, this is not the
case. Once we “find” the “real” political principle, it is easier to discount
dissenting views, even when citizens are sincerely unconvinced of the
merits of the principle, by saying that they are simply mistaken. So,
the realist view has some potentially undemocratic implications (as
described in Peter, 2008).
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The belief motivating this objection is that the contribution
premise is stated too strongly: The idea that everyone’s participation is epistemically helpful is simply an overstatement, because we
know from experience that some people in fact do not make
relevant contributions to deliberation. However, this objection
trades on an ambiguity about what means to exclude in the
epistemic sense. To exclude means to keep something out. To
exclude in the epistemic sense means to keep an argument or
perspective out of deliberation. Deciding that you have nothing to
say is a form of epistemic exclusion. But it does not follow that, if
included in deliberation, any of the positions you advance about a
certain issue will carry the day. The development of the best
available argument is what deliberation is about, on an epistemic
view, and this requires claims to be assessed for their merits. But
even then, arguments found to be wanting are still epistemically
valuable. For example, unconvincing but well-crafted and well-
intended arguments can shape our collective knowledge and
understanding of a political norm or decision by refining our
sense of what is justifiable and what is not, or by sensitizing us to
points of view we had not considered fully beforehand. These
“failed” arguments can serve as bridges to more successful ones.
Therefore, we can justify an epistemic principle of inclusion
supported by the contribution premise without denying that
deliberative ability varies across individuals and groups. All that
variability tells us is that once included, some arguments will be
articulated with more skill by some than by others. But all such
arguments are more likely to make a contribution if they are
included than excluded. We have no epistemic reason to assume in
advance of a deliberation which arguments are likely to be successful in shaping the political norm or decision in question. And only
if we were to accept the idea that all arguments and claims have
equal epistemic weight would we have to conclude that the
variability of deliberative competence necessarily leads to exclusion, for it would mean that convincing (or failing to convince)
could only be attributed to deliberative skill and not the epistemic
quality or importance of the arguments being made.
Epistemic inclusion means that we must accord presumptive
epistemic value to the reasons that our fellow citizens offer in
practical discourse, giving them time and opportunity to test those
reasons against other arguments and points of view. To do otherwise would be an act of exclusion, and an epistemically bad act at
that. But what about children? Everything turns on whether we
should accord this presumption to children, and a plausible
argument can indeed be made for jettisoning the contribution
premise in their case. This is because an argument from circumspection could be used to advance the view that children’s political
inclusion will, all things considered, extract an epistemic cost on
deliberation, a cost high enough to undermine the epistemic point
and purpose of inclusion.
Here is how: In a deliberative democracy, we usually cannot
presume to know who the knowers are, or even what counts as a
good knower, with respect to various political questions. This is
why it would be a mistake to exclude individuals or groups from
deliberation in advance. But the argument from circumspection
claims that children are different. They may state reasons
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capriciously. They may leave other deliberators uncertain as to
whether their reasons accurately reflect their preferences or
interests. They may unwittingly amplify a political point of view
whose implications they do not, and cannot, fully understand.
Their own developing views may come to be unduly (even if
unintentionally) shaped by persuasive deliberators before they
have acquired the ability to critically reflect on, and revise, such
views.
All this is to say that an argument from circumspection claims
that children represent the one and only group for whom we say,
“We know that they do not know.” No generalization to other adults
follows from this claim, because while it concedes that we cannot
know with reasonable certainty that other adults do not know (the
contribution premise holds), we can know with reasonable
certainty that children do not know (the contribution premise
fails). In other words, the inclusion of children carries an epistemic
cost that we can reasonably anticipate before deliberation, which in
turn supplies citizens with reasonable grounds for excluding them
from public deliberation altogether.7
Should deliberative democrats be convinced by the argument
from circumspection? There are some strongly intuitive grounds
for deliberative communities to approach the inclusion of children
with caution. These intuitions may reflect a pretheoretical understanding of the epistemic value of deliberating with others. Yet
there also seems to be some equally strong reasons, as expressed
by the epistemic principle of political inclusion, for ensuring that
they are included. Philosophers sympathetic with the deliberative
democratic ideal, especially those who recognize deliberation’s
epistemic value, should address this issue head on if they wish to
fully articulate deliberative democracy as a political framework.
Therefore, in what follows, I look at several arguments for children’s deliberative inclusion and assess the extent to which they can
plausibly reconcile this tension. I then reconstruct the relevant
features of these arguments to present an account of my own.

7 Why not assess children’s capacity to contribute on a case-by-case basis?
First, it isn’t clear what specific competences would warrant some
children to be included over others. Second, if we were to specify them,
we would reintroduce the generalization problem by at the same time
proffering an argument for the exclusion of relevantly similar adults.
Finally, there is also the question of justice. That is, it’s quite likely that
the criteria we use to make case by case judgements about children’s
deliberative competence would arbitrarily favor children who have
received various social, economic or other advantages that make it easier
for them to signal such competence. This could result in a deliberative
community in which the interests of well-off children have greater
epistemic authority than those of other children, which, in turn, would
undermine the epistemic quality of the deliberation. For an analysis of
citizenship tests and “case-by-case” approaches to democratic inclusion
from the standpoint of political justice and fairness, see Fowler (2014,
p. 101–104). For an analysis of the role of education in addressing
inequalities in deliberative competence on epistemic grounds, see
(Martin, 2016).
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Deliberative Inclusion and Children in Political Philosophy
The Argument from Children’s Distinctiveness
Can the argument from circumspection be decisively defeated?
One could start from the view that children are not only an
independent source of reasons about justice that we need to hear
from but also a distinctive source of reasons. On this view of
deliberation, “childhood” represents a singular social or cultural
perspective—a separate and valuable state—on par with other
ways of life. Kulynych (2001), for example, claims that our political
culture fails to adequately include the distinctive social perspective
of children within the deliberative public sphere. The ideals of
adulthood and maturity have together reinforced the view that
children are the “disorderly outsiders” of deliberation in a way that
impoverishes, as it were, the child’s own point of view.
Here, the exclusion of children from the public sphere
constitutes a fundamental epistemic loss to the extent that our
norms of justice, as well as the political decisions derived from
them, will always be prone to error when an entire social group is
excluded. Part of the argument’s appeal here is that, if sound, we
would have an overriding epistemic reason for the inclusion of
children. This is because even if the inclusion of children has
epistemic costs, these costs are actually quite negligible relative to
exclusion because no conception of justice could be epistemically
successful without a “child’s perspective” coming to inform it.
Is this a plausible view? First, while it is true that children
have distinctive interests from those of adults, it does not follow
that these distinctive interests are bound to their stage of life or that
their exclusion is a fundamental epistemic error. For example,
children’s interests can be forward-looking, such as an interest in
becoming an autonomous person. These interests often trump
children’s short-term interests. Second, even if we conceded
that childhood represented a singular social perspective it is an
ephemeral one. Children may have interests that only come with
being a child, but they will not have these interests for very long,
relatively speaking. Both observations rule against the account’s
plausibility because they prevent us from fully explaining away
some persistent intuitions about how we should treat children,
intuitions that the argument from children’s distinctiveness would
have us drop. For example, we can acknowledge that children exist
in a distinctive “life-world” in which certain interests, values and
preferences have their own currency. But this does not give us any
reason for withholding our circumspection. If anything, the
would-be distinctiveness of the child’s world may give us additional reasons to be circumspect and exclude them from discourse
because their own “all things considered” interests may be distorted by the immediate and idiosyncratic nature of the distinctive
world in which they reside. It therefore seems that the claim that
children are distinctive can cut either way: toward exclusion or
toward inclusion.

The Argument from Public Understanding
It is plausible to think that children have some interests that are
distinctive to their stage of life but just as plausible to claim that
adults should make sure that these distinct interests do not
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compromise the child’s long-term interests. However, another
argument for why inclusion should trump circumspection
could be that justification to children in deliberation has epistemic
benefits that trump the cost of their inclusion. Beckman (2008), for
example, interprets Rawls’s (1996) liberal principle of legitimacy to
mean that the basic structure of society must be justified to all
persons, including children. Accordingly, Beckman proposes an
“adults as children” conception of trustee justification where
deliberants imaginatively enter into the child’s perspective and ask
what they would want as children were they rational or reasonable
(p. 150). Initially, trustee justification might suggest that children
are not granted the epistemic presumption because adults
are doing all the cognitive work. But Beckman distinguishes here
between the acceptability of principles of justice by reasonable
persons and the public understanding of principles of justice by all
(p. 149). Children are not often reasonable and as such are not
party to the rejection or acceptance of principles of justice—they
need trustees to do that. But he further argues that political
legitimacy requires that principles of justice be understood by both
the reasonable and unreasonable alike, and this includes children
(p. 143). Accordingly, Beckman claims that:
[e]ffective communication with children is likely to bring along more
sensitivity to children’s viewpoints and interests. Anyone involved
in the task of explaining to the child what justice requires, what rights
they should and should not have, will want the reasons to appear as
reasonable. In anticipating the child’s objections to what we say, we
will take care that we have adequately taken the child’s perspective
into account. (p. 150)

But is this really epistemic inclusion? Anticipating the
objections of someone we are deliberating with is not the same as
soliciting their reasons for accepting or contesting a norm. For
example, I may anticipate that an audience of children will object
to my claim that they must go to school until they are of age. I may
offer some reasons why they should be compelled to go school and
package them in a way that makes this requirement easier for them
to appreciate. But at no point must I take their objections seriously,
nor do I have to alter my original justification for why they have to
go to school. It is simply not the case that anticipating what a child
might object to necessarily involves taking their perspective
seriously in the epistemic sense, that is, that their point of view is a
source of independent reasons essential to ensuring that the
decision is of sufficient epistemic quality.
My view is that Beckman’s argument for children’s inclusion is
political, not epistemic. Being able to account for our judgements
is certainly part of what it means to justify something. However,
“account for” and “justifying to” reflect weaker and stronger
epistemic requirements. Explaining to children falls under the
weaker sense understood by teachers: that in trying to teach
something to someone we can discover ways to better account for,
or communicate, that thing. That is to say, effective communication does not entail a change in the propositional content or logical
structure of what is taught. For example, there is a difference in
taking the child’s level of comprehension into account when
explaining a moral principle and taking a child’s reasons into
democracy & education, vol 26, n-o 2

account when attempting to justify that same principle. The latter
involves an epistemic presumption while the former does not.
With communicability and greater understanding comes legitimacy and political stability but not necessarily greater epistemic
quality.

The Argument from Nondomination
Another argument for why deliberative inclusion should trump
circumspection is that it is a necessary condition of political
freedom. The argument from public understanding saw the
communication of principles of justice to citizens as a condition of
political legitimacy. On the view I explore here, a political authority
must know and understand the interests of those it exercises
authority over and be moved by that knowledge and understanding in ways that help those citizens, if that exercise is to be legitimate. For example, Bohman (2011) has argued that children, like
any citizen, should be protected from domination by the state
(p. 135; Pettit, 1997). However, the state can only avoid dominating
children when it is able to track their opinions and interests
(Bohman, 2011, p. 135). The problem is how to ensure that such
tracking is accurate. This is where the epistemic angle on deliberation becomes important. For while we might think that parents
and other trustees should do the tracking, a paternalistic treatment
of those interests may lead to misinterpretations or misunderstandings that lead to bad policies.8
Bohman (2011) thinks that this is serious enough a problem to
justify extending the rights of communicative freedom to children.
As he put it:
[communicative rights] provides a standing on which a child or others
without [full legal status] become “self-originating source of claims”
(Rawls, 1996, 509) . . . recognition of a shared communicative status in
the public sphere is cosmopolitan in the sense that it is not derived
from some other membership but rather from mutually granted . . .
communicative freedom of addressing others and being addressed by
them. (p. 136)

For Bohman (2011), communicative freedom is fundamental
to protecting children from domination by state power by ensuring
that their independent, or self-originating, opinions and interests
can circulate (and be tracked) within the public sphere.
One appealing feature of Bohman’s (2011) account is that it
offers normative reasons why children’s opinions and interests have
epistemic value in democratic deliberation: Knowing and
8 On this account, domination occurs when the state exercises its
authority over others (such as children) without taking seriously their
interests. But nondomination does not mean that the state should only
account for the expressed interests of children. For example, compulsory
schooling is often justified on the grounds that children have an interest
in receiving an education, even if they do not understand this interest.
However, we can use the concept of nondomination in order make a
distinction between a state that uses the compulsory argument to engage
in domination and one that does not. For example, perhaps in the
former case, the state refuses to consider the opinions and interests that
children have about their own education and in all cases imposes a
particular view of what a good education should look like, while in the
former the state is willing to hear out children’s points of view.
feature article

7

understanding these opinions and interests are necessary to avoid
domination.
But is this argument strong enough to defeat circumspection?
The argument against circumspection is that children are entitled
to the presumption that their claims have epistemic value even
if their inclusion involves some other epistemic costs. But it is not
clear what this argument means at the level of deliberative practice.
Bohman’s (2011) central claim is that knowing and understanding
children’s opinions and interests are necessary to avoid domination. But the path from knowing about children’s beliefs and
opinions to policies that avoid nondomination can be formulated
in either a weak or strong epistemic sense, each with different
implications for our deliberative practices.
Understood in the weak sense, the epistemic value of children’s communicative freedom is because its exercise supplies the
public sphere with information about what children happen to
value and believe. This information can be useful in developing
effective policies. For example, knowing what children believe and
value can be used to identify incentives that make it easier for
political communities to achieve their goals. But there is no sense
in which what children claim could, by itself, shift those goals.
Treating children as a source of information to refine our own
beliefs about what is just does not require us to see children as an
independent source of beliefs about what is just or fair (see Craig,
1990, p. 43). The weaker version therefore seems insufficient to
defeat circumspection.
Understood in the strong sense, children’s communicative
freedom empowers children to make claims in the public sphere
that reflect needs and interests that the state should take as
seriously as any other claim from any other constituency. This
does appear to defeat circumspection, because without their
inclusion, the political community has no way of being certain that
it’s decisions are nondominating (even if their participation has
other epistemic costs).
However, this argument does not leave the deliberative
relationship between adults and children entirely symmetrical.
This is because we can distinguish between individuals as self-
originating, or independent, sources of claims about justice, and
being reliable, valid, or credible sources of such claims. An adult
deliberator can believe that children should be included for
epistemic reasons while at the same time believing that they are less
reliable than adults in terms of what they claim to know. There is no
inherent contradiction in holding to both beliefs. What arises from
them is an understanding about one’s deliberative practice, that is,
that children should be included but that their discursive claims
are to be treated judiciously and carefully.
In fact, circumspection provides reasonable grounds for
thinking that asymmetry between adults and children within
deliberation is necessary for securing children’s non-domination.
In recognizing children’s claims about justice as independent,
responsible deliberators should carefully weigh the consequences
of those claims for the long-term interests of children even when
those claims sound convincing or persuasive. Circumspection
reminds us that we should engage with children’s beliefs and
opinions on what is just and fair with a sense of paternal
democracy & education, vol 26, n-o 2

responsibility. We need to track the opinions and interests of
children accurately, and this requires their inclusion. But accuracy
is not the same as validity. Adults have reason to take children
seriously as an independent source of claims about justice and
fairness, but they also have reason to hold such claims to greater
scrutiny and be more cautious in drawing conclusions about what
these claims mean for policy. Further, adults should be careful to
scale their degree of circumspection (and paternalism) depending
on the child’s cognitive, affective, and conative abilities.

Epistemic Inclusion and the Aims of Schooling
I conclude that deliberative democrats should extend epistemic
inclusion to children and, in so doing, treat them as an independent source of claims about what is just and fair. Once included,
adult deliberators have a responsibility to practice circumspection
about the claims children make as befits their degree of deliberative
competence. This is because they have reasonable grounds for
anticipating that such claims are less likely to be reliable, all things
considered. It seems to me that this tension is not something that
should be troubling for deliberative democrats, because it
acknowledges that all points of view can make an epistemic
contribution without requiring us to abdicate our responsibilities
to children, responsibilities that continue to hold within deliberation. The mistake lies in concluding that the epistemic value of
deliberative democracy commits us either to the view that children’s relative unreliability as a source of independent claims
justifies their exclusion from the deliberative public sphere
altogether, or that our intuitions about their vulnerability are
oppressive and unjustly paternal. We can take some solace in
the idea that that seeing children as an independent source
of reasons about justice, as opposed to being merely a source of
information, entails a serious shift in how we should understand
deliberative democracy as a political framework even when this
shift is somewhat tempered by adult circumspection.
To show how, I want to focus on an implication of my
argument for how the role of schools should be understood within
deliberative democracy. Consider first that despite the account of
children’s inclusion proffered above, there remains a real possibility
that circumspection opens children up to a different form of
domination. Fricker’s (2007) account of epistemic injustice has
highlighted how minorities and other marginalized groups
experience prejudice in their status as “knowers.” These forms of
prejudice either dismiss a person’s testimony about what they
believe to be the case or have the effect of undermining a discriminated groups’ ability to trust in, and articulate, their own views and
experiences. Fricker’s work has provoked a widespread reassessment of knowledge practices in a variety of domains, including the
relationship between political authority and deliberative democracy, where she argues that within the deliberative democratic
context, citizens should be able to successfully contest or justify
norms and policies (2013). The conditions she sees as necessary for
the possibility of deliberative success are already familiar to
deliberative democrats: open procedures, the representation of all
affected in those procedures, and institutions that enable such
contestation (Fricker, 2013, p. 1323). However, she also advances
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epistemic justice as an additional necessary condition (Fricker,
2013, p. 1323). As she put it:
[d]uring the debate-like exchange that constitutes the contestation the
citizen . . . must be subject neither to testimonial injustice, nor to
hermenutical injustice in respect of what she needs to communicate.
Epistemic justice of these two anti-discriminatory kinds are
requirements for contestation, because if the citizen suffers an unjust
deficit either of credibility or of intelligibility, then s/he precisely
cannot get a fair hearing that contestation requires. (Fricker, 2013,
p. 1324)

We can easily make the connection to children’s inclusion, for
while we may see children as an independent source of reasons, the
concern here is that being circumspect about those reasons because
they are children is unfairly prejudicial about their status as
knowers. If true, circumspection opens the door to treating
children within deliberation in ways that, individually or structurally, prevents them for articulating or contesting norms or principles to the best of their ability.
How do we know when circumspection is justified and when
it represents mere discrimination? Circumspection is different
from discrimination when the reasons for being circumspect are
not arbitrary, and our reasons for being circumspect about
children’s claims are not arbitrary because we have good reasons
for believing that children are relatively inexperienced knowers on
matters of justice and fairness, and for this reason prone to error.
However, I believe that Fricker’s epistemic justice condition places
on obligation on adult deliberators even when circumspection is
justified. A deliberative community also has an obligation to avoid
what I call formative epistemic injustice: treatment that undermines the development of competences necessary for individuals
and groups to successfully contest norms and policies within
deliberation. Examples of such treatment within the deliberative
context could involve an unwillingness on the part of adult
deliberators to help children articulate or make sense of their
interests and experiences, or to treat children’s claims merely as a
source of information, or to take a dismissive or condescending
attitude to their independent claims. These deliberative practices
go beyond by exhibiting mere caution by denying the child the
experience of being treated as a reliable knower simply because of
their relative lack of experience.
What is the harm in such treatment? The experience of being
recognized as a reliable knower, even when one is not, plays a role
in the development of one’s agency as deliberator. Accordingly,
being systematically denied such experiences undermines the
development of one’s deliberative agency and competence. Note
that epistemic injustice can obtain even when the individual or
group in question lacks full credibility as a knower. The injustice in
question is not so much a form of discrimination as the denial of an
educational opportunity that should be valued highly within a
deliberative political framework. Consider further that Fricker
argues that epistemic injustice should not happen “during the
debate” (Fricker, 2013, p. 1324). But from a formative point of view,
the absence of discrimination is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for securing epistemic justice. This is because even
democracy & education, vol 26, n-o 2

though it is permissible to be circumspect about the epistemic
value of children’s claims as befits their competence, circumspection writ large across the deliberative community may nonetheless
inhibit the development of those habits of mind and conceptual
resources needed for the successful contestation of norms.
Therefore, while we have reason to be circumspect about children’s
independent beliefs and opinions, formative epistemic justice
suggests that we also have good reasons to treat the expression and
articulation of beliefs and opinions about what is just and fair with
greater care and discernment than competence warrants on its
own. Balancing between these requires discernment on the part
of adult deliberators and depends on the deliberative competence of the particular child or adolescent and the kind of claim
they are making.
The key question is how general the problem of formative
epistemic justice is for deliberative democracy, and this is where
the epistemic costs of inclusion come back into the picture. It
would be unreasonable, I think, to require every adult deliberator
to check his or her circumspection simply to support an important
educational project—the development of a future citizen’s ability to
deliberate. But when we move from deliberative democracy
understood in the abstract to the design of our deliberative
democratic institutions, the importance of formative epistemic
justice becomes more salient.
Some institutions bear a greater responsibility for the support
of educational values than others, with schools being especially
important. The conventional view, I take it, is that if deliberative
democracy is a desirable political conception, schools should see
an education for such a conception to be one of their central aims
(Samuelsson, 2016).9 Schools should aim to ensure that children
learn the skills, habits and values that will enable them to exercise
their communicative rights as adults. However, formative epistemic justice shifts this account in an important way. Now we have
a school in which children are being prepared for a deliberative
democratic order partly through the experience of being taken
seriously as an equal epistemic member of a deliberative community. The picture here is of an institution that at the right times, and
for the right reasons, checks circumspection to provide children
with important formative experiences relating to being treated as
an independent and credible source of reasons. Note further that
when children are included in deliberation, checking circumspection incidentally increases the likelihood such children will make
valuable epistemic contributions to political decision-making. In
being more charitable, for example, schools may be surprised to
discover an independent point of view that was not fully appreciated beforehand, potentially reshaping our public knowledge and
understanding of justice in turn.
These considerations place schools in an interesting position.
If schools ignored such discoveries, they would arguably be at a
double deliberative fault: First, their deliberative engagements with
children would be in bad faith in the sense that they would be
merely giving the outward appearance of treating children as full
9 For more on the role of deliberation in schools, see Englund (2009),
Okshevsky (2004), and Sprod (2003).
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epistemic agents to secure an educational benefit. Further, they
would be putting children at greater risk of domination by the state
because they would be knowingly omitting perspectives and
arguments that have the potential to shape how the public sphere
understands questions of justice and fairness.
The way to get around these faults is to understand that,
within the deliberative democratic framework, schools ought also
to play a communicative role, mediating between the independent
claims that children make, circumspection about those claims, and
the public sphere. Schools should not only help deliberative
communities track the interests of children but facilitate the
epistemic value of the claims children make about their interests by
helping them interpret and articulate those claims in ways that
strengthens the public intelligibility, reliability or credibility. It
would be costly for a deliberative community in general to
work this way, but schools can play this distinctive role within
the deliberative framework.
I have argued that the epistemic and educational value of
democratic deliberation are related in a way that establishes a
distinct role for schools. One important objection is that this role is
assigned based on the fact children happen to go to schools, but
nothing about my argument shows why facilitating the public
communication of children’s independent views is something that
should fall within the aims of schooling. I don’t think that this is
really a problem, because schools always have to negotiate the
various educational, social, and economic aims at play within
whatever political framework they may find themselves situated
within, and within a deliberative political framework it would not
be implausible to think that one of those aims would be the
promotion of communication between those that attend school
and the public sphere. More troublesome is the possibility that
restricting this communicative role to the school risks limiting our
serious treatment of children’s beliefs and opinions to their beliefs
and opinions about the institution in which they are happen to be
treated as full epistemic agents, which just is the world of schooling. If the only institutional space in which children are treated as
full epistemic agents is the school, it may be that the only opinions
and beliefs we will hear much from children about is the world of
schooling. This is an objection worth taking seriously, and I have
two replies that I think mitigate this concern.
First, note that on my account, children should play a
deliberative role in decision-making bodies other than schools,
even when circumspection applies to them. Children are granted
communicative rights that should be secured and exercised in a
variety of institutions on a range of issues, such as health care, law,
and government itself. Second, we should think of schools in the
deliberative political framework serving not merely a communicative function but as subject to communicative obligations. An
analogy drawn from the moral and legal duty for teachers report
child neglect might be helpful in explaining the distinction. When
teachers hear things from students about their lives outside of the
school that call into question the student’s safety and well-being,
teachers have a moral and legal obligation to report. Similarly, I
think, when schools encounter beliefs and opinions that bear
importantly on children’s lives in school or outside, schools have an
democracy & education, vol 26, n-o 2

obligation to help communicate those beliefs and opinions to the
public sphere. Schools in their communicative role should
facilitate children’s independent claims not only about the justice
of their life in schools but about issues of justice and fairness that
they care about in general.
These and other features of communicative schools need to be
unpacked in more detail. What should teaching and learning look
like, and how should teachers and students navigate challenges that
the public sphere itself faces, such as political polarization and
group bias? I think we have the theoretical and conceptual tools
needed to answer these questions. But they require imaginative
uptake from others interested in the deliberative democratic
project. Some of those others could and should, I think, include
“nonvoting minors” themselves.
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